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Abstract 
  
To date, 40 U.S. states have passed human trafficking legislation; however, the 
comprehensiveness and stringency of the legislation significantly varies from state to 
state, and there remains significant ambiguity as to why this is the case.  This study 
examines a number of factors that may impact the comprehensiveness of human 
trafficking legislation at the state level, focusing on the gender makeup of the legislature, 
the partisan makeup of the legislature, and policy diffusion based on geographic 
proximity.  To test these hypotheses, we develop a comprehensive data set, including a 
uniquely designed dependent variable measuring legislative comprehensiveness for each 
state.  We find evidence that bi-partisanship, increased numbers of female legislators, and 
geographic diffusion all positively impact legislative comprehensiveness--findings that 
will assist activists as they continue to develop a strategic plan for passing comprehensive 
human trafficking legislation in all 50 states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
1 Paper Prepared for presentation at the University of Nebraska Interdisciplinary Conference on 
Human Trafficking, October 29-31st, 2009.  
I. Human Trafficking and Legislative Comprehensiveness 
To date, over forty states have passed some type of human trafficking legislation, which may be 
a critical step towards eradicating human trafficking in the United States. The important thing to 
recognize, however, is that this legislation takes many forms; across the states there is significant 
variation in the comprehensiveness of anti-trafficking legislation. Although there are multiple 
ways to operationalize this variation, we categorize human trafficking legislation along three 
lines. First, a state can pass legislation promoting State Investment, which includes such things as 
victim assistance, creation of a human trafficking task force, mandatory training for police 
officers, or commissioned reports. Second, legislation can include Civil Penalties, which pertain 
to issues of restitution, asset forfeiture, civil action, and affirmative defense. Third, human 
trafficking legislation can Criminalize human trafficking, delineating maximum sentences for 
different subgroups (e.g. minors and adults) and different types of crimes (e.g. labor versus sex 
trafficking). When devising legislation a state can choose to make provisions in the law for only 
a fraction of one of these categories, such as creating a task force, or they can embrace parts of 
all of each of the categories of criminalization, civil penalties, and state investment. This choice 
is not without consequence. The more comprehensive a state’s legislation, the more likely that 
state will be successful in the fight against human trafficking, for no other reason than they are 
taking a strong stance against it. However, as consequential as legislative comprehensiveness 
may be, we have little to no understanding of its determinants. This paper seeks to fill this void, 
asking what state-level factors contribute to comprehensive human trafficking legislation.  
 
Although there are numerous ways to conceptualize this issue, we argue that the most 
consequential factors are the gender makeup of the legislature, the partisan makeup of the 
legislature, and policy diffusion based on geographic proximity.  The following three sections 
will delve into these factors in turn, discussing 1) the theoretical reasons we expect them to play 
a significant role, and 2) qualitative evidence that supports our expectations.  
 
II. Theoretical Considerations 
It has been well documented that female politicians feel as if they must be surrogate 
representatives, legislating on behalf of women throughout the country (Carroll 2002). 
Consequently, there appear to be distinct differences between the policy priorities of male and 
female legislators, with females more likely to introduce women’s issue bills (Saint-Germain 
1989; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Carroll 2001; Boles 2001; Swers 2002; Thomas and Welch 
1991, 2001; Poggione 2004; Reingold 1992; Barnello and Bratton 2007). For example, female 
legislators are more likely to propose legislation that promotes equality, improves the status of 
women, supports social welfare programs, promotes children and families, or pertains to issues 
of health care (Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendezz 2007; Saint-Germain 1989, Bratton 2002).  
 
There are several reasons why we should expect this link between descriptive representation and 
substantive representation.2 In particular, Mansbridge (1999) argues, “descriptive representation 
enhances the substantive representation of interests by improving the quality of deliberation…in 
contexts of uncrystallized, not fully articulated, interests” (1999: 628). Shared historical 
discrimination and life experiences are essential for understanding this argument. In situations 
where ambiguous or non-delineated policy areas are being discussed, a politician will be likely to 
impute her own experiences into the decision-making process. Mansbridge explains that good 
examples of these uncrystallized policy areas are sexual harassment and violence against women 
(1999: 207), and we posit that human trafficking also falls well within this category because of 
its nascence as a public policy issue. In these types of uncrystallized issue areas, constituents will 
greatly benefit from descriptive representation because the deliberation occurring between 
politicians in the legislature will be enhanced with gender diversity. Although increased 
deliberation is positive in and of itself, we also expect that in these issue areas, female legislators 
will be more likely to push for pro-woman policies and initiatives. As Mansbridge explains, 
“particularly on issues that are uncrystallized or that many legislators have not fully thought 
through, the personal quality of being oneself a member of an affected group gives the legislator 
a certain moral force in making an argument or asking for a favorable vote on an issue important 
to the group” (1999: 648).  
 
Although the operationalization of ‘women’s-issues’ has not been standardized, the underlying 
sentiment is that women are more likely to focus on issues that will disproportionately benefit 
female constituents or that typically fall within the stereotypical feminine domain. This is why                                                         
2 By substantive representation we mean that female representative act for their female constituents. Specifically, 
substantive representation pertains to policy outputs and policy priorities.  
we see legislation pertaining to health care, education, family wellness, women’s rights, and 
social welfare all fall within the overall domain of ‘women’s-issues.’ We argue that human 
trafficking is another policy issue that fits aptly within this women’s issue framework.  First, it 
has implications for women’s rights, health care, and families. Second, the majority of 
trafficking victims are women and girls for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation, and 
thus, female legislators are therefore likely to feel it is their obligation to advocate on behalf of 
trafficking victims. Third, human trafficking is seen as a social welfare and human rights issue, 
so we would expect women to more likely to sponsor and/or support such legislation.   
 
Thus far, our qualitative evidence supports the idea that women are more likely than their male 
counterparts to take on human trafficking legislation.  One female representative recounted her 
story about the initial fight for human trafficking legislation in the House, saying that at first the 
only other person that would get behind it was “her sister.” This sentiment was reiterated when 
we interviewed one of her a male colleagues. He explained that, “women are more sensitive to 
women’s issues, children’s issues, and social issues.” Moreover, he went onto explain how 
gender can even trump partisan attachment, citing the fact that Republican women were more 
likely to get behind the legislation than Republican men. He attributed this to the fact that 
“Republican women have broader life experiences.” This quotation directly ties back to the 
notion of uncrystallized interests proposed by Mansbridge, for it is the ‘broader’ life experiences 
of women that make descriptive representation advantageous for female constituents. Moreover, 
we found that geography did not have any discernable impact on the willingness of legislators to 
point out gender differences in the propensity to get involved with trafficking legislation. For 
example, one female legislator in Kentucky explained that as a mother and female, she feels a 
special responsibility to take a stance on issues that impact women and children, and a male 
legislator from New York described that female legislators were more passionate and more 
willing to support human trafficking bills. Taken as a whole, our qualitative evidence points to 
the importance of female legislators for comprehensive human trafficking legislation. Taking 
both the literature and our interviews into consideration, we generate our first hypothesis.   
 
Descriptive Representation Hypothesis:  The greater percentage of women in the House and 
Senate, the more likely a state is to have comprehensive human trafficking legislation.  
 
In addition to gender, we also think that partisanship plays a distinctive role in influencing what 
types of human trafficking legislation a state will adopt. In particular, we anticipate that 
Republicans and Democrats will both ‘get behind’ human trafficking legislation, but will do so 
for different reasons. Well-established facts throughout the Political Science literature, as well as 
conventional wisdom, tell us that Democrats and Republican diverge significantly on issues of 
social welfare and culture, and this partisan division is only growing stronger over time (Brewer 
2005; Layman, Carsey, Horowitz 2006). Specifically, Democrats are more likely to support 
social welfare, whereas the Republican Party has been less willing and eager to use federal 
money on such programs. Thus, we expect that Democrats will be more willing to support 
human trafficking legislation that provides service to victims and/or allocates money for state-
run programs. In other words, we expect Democrats to be more supportive of state investment 
strategies. Another important partisan difference pertains to crime prevention and penalization, 
with those in the Republican Party known as “law and order conservatives,” and those in the 
Democrat party pinned as “ soft on crime liberals” (Gibbs and Bankhead 2001). From the Willie 
Horton advertisement framing the Democratic Dukakis as dangerous, to the Republican driven 
three strikes rule in California, there has been a clear distinction drawn between how each party 
handles criminalization. Thus, for the case of human trafficking, we would expect that 
Republicans would be more likely to promote human trafficking legislation that increased the 
minimum and maximum penalties for traffickers. In other words, we expect Republicans to be 
more supportive of criminalization strategies. 
 
Our qualitative evidence seems to support many of these propositions. Specifically, one male 
legislator from Texas explained that Democrats are more likely to see human trafficking as a 
human rights issue, whereas Republicans are more likely to see it as pertinent to crime and 
morality. Although it was not discussed in great detail, this distinction between morality and 
human rights is quite curious. For him, morality was equated with the “anti-sex” platform of the 
Republican Party, and human rights pertained to a willingness to provide assistance to victims of 
human trafficking. If this is a valid distinction, it might help explain why Republicans are 
focused on criminalization and Democrats on state investment.  The language of one female 
legislator exemplifies this point: “Republicans want to enhance penalties and criminalization, 
and Democrats are more focused on the social justice aspects of the issue.” Interestingly, she also 
explicated how Democrats are more likely than Republicans to frame human trafficking as 
“modern day slavery,” a distinction that points to the partisan divergence on human rights. Taken 
together, these interviews from Texas illustrate that Democrats and Republican may support 
human trafficking legislation for different reasons, but in the end they come together as a non-
partisan force.  
 
In fact, the notions of consensus and compromise repeatedly appeared in our interviews. As one 
Kentucky legislator explained, “networking and building consensus was the key behind the 
success in getting the bill passed.” And a legislator from New York declared “people that 
normally would be on opposite sides of the issue” came together for a “broad-based coalition.”  
Since both parties want human trafficking legislation, albeit for different reasons, there have to 
be concessions made in order to create passable bills. For example, Democrats have to be willing 
to accept strict criminalization if they want victim assistance, and Republicans have to accept 
victim assistance if they desire criminalization. As one Ohio legislator explained, “Democrats 
wouldn’t be as strong about throwing people in jail if they committed a crime, but this is a 
bipartisan issue.” These interviews point to the fact that the most comprehensive legislation may 
be that which is sponsored by both Republicans and Democrats. These considerations 
concerning party, policy preference, and legislative strategy lead to our third hypothesis, which is 
broken into three components.  
 
Party-Neutrality Hypothesis: a) The greater percentage of Democrats in the House and Senate, 
the more likely a state is to have state investment; b) The greater percentage of Democrats in the 
House and Senate, the less likely a state is to have criminalization; c) The percentage of 
Democrats in the House and Senate will have no impact of overall legislative 
comprehensiveness. 
 
In addition to gender and party, we also think that diffusion may play a large role in determining 
the comprehensiveness of a state’s anti-trafficking legislation. Justice Louis Brandeis (1932) 
noted, near the beginning of governmental experimentation within the Great Depression, that one 
of the virtues of American federalism was the possibility of states serving as laboratories of 
democracy, trying new and innovative policies that could later be adopted elsewhere if 
successful. And Jack Walker (1969) purported that, whether due to experimentation and learning 
or due to intergovernmental competition, innovative policies and practices diffuse across states 
from entrepreneurial leaders to later adopters. Scholars of policy diffusion tend to define a policy 
innovation as the adoption of a new policy by a government, regardless of whether or not that 
innovation has already been tried by others (Mintrom 1997a; Walker 1969).  The spread of 
innovations in which current adoptions are a function of prior adoptions elsewhere is then 
referred to as diffusion.  And diffusion is thought to occur in different policy areas through such 
mechanisms as competition among governments, the imitation of one another’s practices, or 
learning about policy success (Shipan and Volden 2008). In the case of human trafficking, we 
expect that as one state begins to adopt and test legislation, other neighboring states will follow 
closely behind.  
 
There are several reasons to expect this diffusion. First, as human trafficking increasingly 
becomes a ‘hot’ issue in the media, states do not want to appear legislatively stunted. And 
importantly, this pressure becomes all the more potent if neighboring states have already passed 
some type of legislation to combat the issue. As one legislator from Kentucky explained, human 
trafficking was put on the agenda because “other states were adopting at great speed, so it 
became necessary not to fall behind.” Second, in addition to the power of competition, there is a 
great deal of learning taking place. This learning can take operate through a variety of 
mechanisms, from informal discussions between legislators to more formal conferences. For 
example, a legislator from Kentucky explained that she attends the National Council of State 
Legislators every year (NCSL), and the literature disseminated through this council made her 
aware of the legislation passed by other states. These conferences present “a good opportunity to 
talk to legislators about hot topics.” Legislators can learn about what other states are prioritizing, 
how other states craft their legislation, and how other legislators strategize. As one legislator 
asserted, “Networking is important. You can talk to other states and then bring those ideas back 
to your state.” This brings us to the third and final hypothesis. 
  
Policy Diffusion Hypothesis: The higher the proportion of neighboring states that passed human 
trafficking criminalization legislation, the more likely a state is to have comprehensive human 
trafficking legislation. 
 
 
 
III. Empirical Approach 
Dependent Variables 
This research is designed to address the broad question of what factors impact the passage of 
comprehensive human trafficking legislation in the states.  In order to answer this broad 
question, it was first necessary to break down the legislation into its component parts.  We 
created three different categories that could be included in state human trafficking legislation:  
State Investment, Civil Penalties, and Criminalization.  State investment has four possible 
components, each of which became its own separate dependent variable:  Victim Assistance, 
Task Force, Training, and Reports.  We analyzed the human trafficking legislation in every 
state, and each category received a 1 if the legislation made specifications for that area.  We then 
created a dummy variable called State Investment Dummy, which codes a 1 if the state made 
any of the four provisions above.3 
 
The second category is civil penalties, which has four aspects. Similar to the model for state 
investment, each of these also became its own separate dependent variable:  Restitution, Asset 
Forfeiture, Civil Action, and Affirmative Defense.  Each of these variables took on a value of 1 
if the law made specific provisions for it.  Similar to the state investment variables, we created a 
Civil Penalties Dummy, which took on a value of 1 if the state made provisions in the law for 
any of the above four civil courses of action.4  
 
The third aspect of the law was criminalization.  Given the vastly different criminal codes in 
every state, we looked up what the minimum and maximum penalties were for the felony 
convictions in the law, and coded accordingly for each state.  These dependent variables are 
Maximum Sentence Trafficking Minor and Maximum Sentence Trafficking Adult, which are 
the maximum number of years in prison a trafficker could receive if convicted of the felony 
                                                        
3 We also created a sliding scale for the state investment category that ranged from 0 if a state did not make any state 
investment, to 4 if a state made all the possible state investments in human trafficking.  We used this sliding scale 
state investment variable to conduct an ordered probit model, and the results were significant, but similar enough to 
the logit model that we did not include it in the paper. 
4 We also created a sliding scale for the civil penalties category that ranged from 0 to 4.  We used this variable to 
conduct an ordered probit model, but the results were not significant so we simply used the logit model with the 
dummy variable instead. 
(bearing in mind that it is very rare to receive the maximum).5  We also created a dummy 
variable, Criminalize Dummy, for whether or not a state criminalized human trafficking at all in 
a certain year. After breaking the laws into sub-components, we were able to determine the 
overall comprehensiveness of the legislation.  In order to do this, we simply created a sliding 
scale variable that ranges from 0 to 3 (0=did not adopt anything, 3=adopted state investment, 
civil penalties, and criminalization).  This variable is called Legislative Comprehensiveness.    
 
Independent Variables 
As noted, we hypothesize that partisanship, gender, and policy diffusion will all play a 
significant role in determining what types of anti-trafficking legislation will be passed. In order 
to capture the impact of partisanship, we include the Percentage of Democrats in the House and 
Percentage of Democrats in the Senate. We expect that the coefficients for each of these 
variables will be positive in the state investment and civil penalties models, negative in the 
criminalization model, and neutral in the comprehensiveness model. The impact of gender is 
captured by our second set of independent variables, the Percentage of Women in the House 
and Percentage of Women in the Senate. We expect these coefficients to be positive in the state 
investment, civil penalties, criminalization, and comprehensiveness models. Lastly, in order to 
capture the impact of policy diffusion, we created a variable Neighboring States that codes for 
the proportion of neighboring states that passed human trafficking criminalization legislation. 
Similar to the gender variables, we expect this variable to be positive across all of the models.  
 
Control Variables 
In addition to the main independent variables, it is essential to control for other state-level factors 
that may influence the adoption of anti-trafficking legislation. First, following the lead of 
Fellowes, Gray, and Lowery (2006), we recognize that the economic situation of the state may 
play a role in determining what types of policies they adopt. Specifically, states with stronger 
economies may have greater flexibility to focus on post-materialist concerns (2006:35). Thus, we 
control for whether a state has a Surplus, which is revenue minus expenditures. We expect those                                                         
5 We coded for the following sentences:  Minimum Sex Trafficking Minor, Maximum Sex Trafficking Minor, 
Minimum Sex Trafficking Adult, Maximum Sex Trafficking Adult, Minimum Labor Trafficking Minor, Maximum 
Labor Trafficking Minor, Minimum Labor Trafficking Adult, Maximum Labor Trafficking Adult.  For the sake of 
parsimony, and because many of the results were very similar, we used only models for Maximum Sex Trafficking 
Minor and Maximum Sex Trafficking Adult. 
states with higher surpluses to focus more attention on human trafficking legislation and be 
willing to allocate their resources towards the issue.  
 
Moreover, qualitative evidence gathered through our interviews points to the fact that states with 
high percentages of illegal immigrants may be less willing to pass anti-trafficking legislation for 
a variety of different reasons.  First, in states like Texas, the fear among some interest group 
activists was that human trafficking would be likened to smuggling and that a human trafficking 
bill would be used as “an excuse to go after economic refugees.”  A very different reason is the 
concern among some legislators that human trafficking legislation would be used to assist illegal 
immigrants.  For example, a female representative from Ohio recounted a story where one 
member of her committee declared, “You mean you are going to use state money to protect 
illegal immigrants.” For these reasons, we include a control for Illegal Immigrants per capita. 
 
The third control variable that we use is Violent Crime per capita, which we expect to be 
negative across all models for two reasons.  First, those with lower violent crime rates might be 
more proactive in recognizing human trafficking within the state, and second, be able to direct 
more particularized time and attention to combating this problem.  We also control for the 
Population in a state. For the victim assistance and criminalization models we expect this 
variable to be positive because these states may have more resources (bureaucratic, monetary, 
human) that they are able to direct towards human trafficking. However, the impact of 
population in the civil penalties model is rather exploratory. Lastly, we include a variable that 
captures whether a legislature is Professional or Part-Time, which is as scale ranging from one 
for the most professionalized legislature to five for most part-time legislature. This scale captures 
the amount of time legislators spend on the job, the amount they are compensated, and the size of 
their staff. We expect the coefficients for this variable to be negative; the more professionalized a 
legislature, the more time and resources they have to devote to human trafficking legislation.  
 
All of our dependent variables in the first two tables are binary, so we used logit models to test 
our hypotheses.  Each observation in the dataset is a state in a year, ranging from 2003 to 2008.  
All 50 states are included in our dataset, which means there are 300 observations total.  In Table 
3, Models 1 and 2 have continuous dependent variables that measure maximum prison sentences, 
therefore we used OLS regression.  Model 4 in Table 2 is the legislative comprehensiveness 
model with a sliding scale ranging from 0 to 3; thus, we ran an ordered probit model to test 
legislative comprehensiveness.   
 
IV. Results 
State Investment 
Model 1 of Table 1 tests the factors most likely to contribute to states’ adoption of legislation 
that makes provisions to use state funding to assist victims of human trafficking.  The two 
variables that carry significant weight in predicting victim assistance are the percentage of 
females in the House of Representatives, and the proportion of neighboring states that adopted 
human trafficking legislation.  In fact, when the percentage of females in the House is set at its 
mean of 23 percent, the predicted probability of passing human trafficking legislation that 
includes assistance for victims is only 2 percent, ceteris paribus; however, when the percentage 
of females in the House is increased to 43 percent (which is the highest percentage in any state—
Maryland in 2005), the predicted probability of providing for victim assistance jumps to 17 
percent. 
 
The other significant variable, proportion of neighboring states to adopt human trafficking 
legislation, is highly significant across all models of state investment, civil penalties, and 
criminalization.  It is instructive to take a moment to discuss the reasons why this is the case.  
First, this variable serves also as a proxy for the temporal aspect of the model.  As the years 
passed from 2003 to 2008, more and more states adopted legislation, which means a larger 
portion of the country was covered with the legislation, and more neighboring states were 
covered.  Thus, this variable picks up the variance across time and the notion that, as time passes, 
states are more likely to adopt human trafficking legislation.  Second, it means that pressure to 
pass human trafficking legislation becomes greater as more states adopt.  State legislators are 
generally aware what their colleagues in other states are doing.  Indeed, one female state senator 
from Kentucky that sponsored the human trafficking legislation in that state said that she attends 
the National Council of State Legislators conference every year, she tries to attend the Southern 
conference—which she prefers because she likes to learn about what the surrounding states are 
prioritizing—and she specifically learned from NCSL literature that other states were moving 
forward on the issue of human trafficking.  This made her more determined to get a law on the 
books in Kentucky. 
 
Models 2-4 show the key variables in passing legislation to create a state human trafficking task 
force, training programs on human trafficking, and reports on the human trafficking situation in 
the state, respectively.  The results with respect to female legislators in the House and Senate are 
highly significant and extremely instructive.  In Models 2 and 4, as there are more females in the 
both the House and Senate, there is an increased likelihood of creating a human trafficking task 
force and commissioned reports on human trafficking.  Specifically, when the percent of women 
in both the House and Senate is set at their maximum [43 percent and 47 percent—e.g. Arizona 
2008—respectively], the predicted probability of human task force creation is an astounding 74 
percent, versus only 2 percent when set at their means.  Likewise, the predicted probability of 
commissioned reports is 81 percent when women are set at their maximum, versus only 6 percent 
likelihood when set at their means.  This is a very significant result and one worth dwelling on 
for a moment.  Women legislators have been known to be more collaborative in general 
(Rosenthal 1998), and this characteristic is only amplified when dealing with a subject such as 
human trafficking, which female legislators call an “emotional” issue that “strikes at the soul.”  
One female representative from Ohio said it is analogous to when one of her female colleagues 
introduced breastfeeding legislation, at which their male colleagues “scoffed,” but which the 
female legislators understood to be a big problem.  Likewise, she said that while most people 
remain skeptical that the issue of human trafficking is a problem, females are more believing.  
Thus, their generally collaborative style, coupled with the nature of the issues of human 
trafficking, makes the creation of a human trafficking task force and regular reporting on the 
issue significantly more likely as women comprise a larger portion of the legislature.6   
 
Across all the models on state investment in Table 1, there are inconsistent results with respect to 
the direction and significance of Democrats in the House and Senate.  In Models 1-5, as the 
percentage of Democrats increases, the likelihood of passing legislation that invests state 
resources into the issue of human trafficking decreases (though it is significant only for reports).                                                          
6 Model 3 shows a significant effect that the more females in the Senate, the less likely to mandate training programs 
in the law, and Model 1 maintains a similar effect for victim assistance, though it is not significant.  It is unclear why 
this is the case, and it should be explored in greater detail in future work.  
In contrast, as the proportion of Democrats in the House increases, the likelihood of passing 
legislation that makes a state investment in human trafficking increases, and significantly so for 
the creation of task forces, training programs, and reporting.  We hypothesized that it would be 
positive in both chambers.  Indeed, interviews across a number of states provide anecdotal 
evidence that suggests that Democrats were pushing more than Republicans for state investment 
in the issue of human trafficking.  A representative from Ohio said Democrats are more 
“compassionate”, a senator from Kentucky said Republicans “weren’t interested,” and an 
assemblyman from New York said Senate Republicans made the “services” aspect of the bill a 
“contentious” issue.  On the other hand, the multi-faceted nature of human trafficking legislative 
needs means there are aspects of the issue that members of both major political parties and both 
genders can get behind.  A number of interviewees, from legislators to lobbyists on the bill, 
mentioned the fact that Republicans wanted to enhance penalties and criminalize, while 
Democrats wanted “social justice.”  In other words, this is not a partisan issue, and the multi-
faceted nature of the issue makes it one that is ideologically palatable to support.  We believe 
that the mixed results with respect to partisanship in the House and Senate support his point. 
 
Civil Penalties 
The civil penalties models do not yield the same significant results as the state investment 
models with respect to female legislators and Democrats.  The coefficients are inconsistently 
positive and negative for the percentage of females in the House and Senate, and inconsistently 
significant.  The results are equally inconsistent both in terms of directionality and significance 
level for the percentage of Democrats in the House and Senate.  Although much qualitative 
evidence suggested that women and Democrats favor civil penalties and restitution over criminal 
penalties, some interviewees stated that women and Democrats have a history of being very 
harsh if the victim is a child.  This could be the reason for the inconsistent results with respect to 
civil penalties. 
 
One interesting contrast between the State Investment models and Civil Penalties models is the 
difference in the illegal immigrant population per capita.  In the state investment models, the 
coefficients for this variable are negative across the board (though not always significant), while 
they are positive across the board for civil penalties.  Why might this be the case?  If it is 
perceived that illegal immigrants are the victims of the crime, perhaps states would be less 
willing to invest their resources to assist these victims (per the quote from an Ohio legislator).  
Instead, the state may prefer to give these victims access to the courts to recover damages from 
the criminal trafficker so they are less needy of the state’s resources.  Given the statistical 
significance of the illegal immigrant population per capita for restitution and asset forfeiture, it 
seems this may, indeed, be the rationale for a number of states. 
 
Criminalization 
While criminalization Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 do not yield very significant results, it is worth 
noting specifically that the models mostly show negative coefficients for the percentage of 
Democrats in the House and Senate.  These coefficients are in the predicted direction, and 
indicate that, as the qualitative evidence suggests, Democrats are less likely to adopt harsh 
criminalization legislation. Model 3 in Table 3 is the criminalization dummy model for whether 
or not a state passed any criminalization legislation.  Percent Democrats in the Senate is 
significant in the negative direction, meaning that states that criminalized human trafficking 
tended to have less Democrats and more Republicans in the Senate.  This is not surprising given 
the criminal aspect of the legislation, however these results actually comport with the results 
from the models of State Investment and Civil Penalties in Tables 1 and 2, where Democrats in 
the Senate are less supportive, even when we would expect them to be more supportive.  On the 
other hand, Democrats in the House are very supportive of all of the different types of human 
trafficking legislation.  This indicates not only that the issue of human trafficking is bipartisan, 
but also that a bicameral legislature is effective in moving forward strong legislation.  So far, it 
appears that bipartisanship, coupled with bicameralism, produces the most comprehensive 
human trafficking legislation. 
 
Legislative Comprehensiveness 
The final model on Table 3 was the primary motivation for this research, and the results for our 
variables of interest are very significant.  First, the legislative comprehensiveness model 
indicates that states with majority Republicans in the Senate adopt the most comprehensive 
legislation.7  On the other hand, states with majority Democrats in the House adopt the most 
comprehensive human trafficking legislation.  Indeed, based on this model, we can conclude that 
human trafficking legislation has strongly benefited from both bipartisanship and bicameralism.  
While Democrats may have wanted state investments and civil penalties, Republicans may have 
wanted tough criminal penalties.  Through the bargaining process within and between the two 
chambers, the most comprehensive legislation was passed.   
 
Furthermore, the legislative comprehensiveness model shows that as the majority of females in 
both the House and the Senate increases, the most comprehensive human trafficking legislation 
is passed.  Among the legislators interviewed, even male legislators stated that the women in 
their chamber seemed to care more about the issue.  A male Democratic representative from 
Texas said that women were “more sensitive” to the issue, and that Republican females were 
more likely to get behind the issue than Republican men.  Also, a male representative from New 
York said that he “definitely noticed greater passion for the issue” among his female colleagues.  
Finally, the neighboring states variable continues to be highly significant.  This means that both 
the temporal and spatial aspect of the legislation is significant.  As more states adopt legislation 
over time, other states tend to pass more comprehensive legislation.  In other words, states are 
most likely learning from their neighbors, and late adopters are crafting more comprehensive 
legislation that earlier states. 
 
V. Discussion 
Legislative Comprehensiveness 
It can be argued that any and all human trafficking legislation is a step in the right direction. That 
being said, it is important to recognize that there is a large variation in the comprehensiveness of 
anti-trafficking legislation across the states. The intent of this analysis was to better understand 
the state-level factors contributing to comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation. 
                                                         
7 All of the cut points in this ordered probit model are statistically different from zero.  In addition, we calculated 
two other test statistics to determine if cut point 2 is statistically different from cut point 1, and if cut point 3 is 
statistically different from cut point 2.  Indeed, the test statistic for the former was 5.35, and for the latter was 6.43.  
These test statistics are very significant, and show that states that adopted no trafficking legislation, and those that 
adopted only partial or full are all statistically different from one another, placing even greater confidence in the 
results of this model.  
Overall, we find support for our hypotheses that gender, party, and diffusion all play a significant 
role in shaping the overall comprehensiveness of a state’s legislation. First, we find that as the 
percentage of women in the House and Senate increase, the more likely a state is to have 
comprehensive legislation. This not only confirms our suspicions that human trafficking was 
framed as a ‘woman’s issue,’ but also it lends further proof to the line of research showing that 
female legislators behave in a manner that is distinct from their male counterparts. As noted 
below, many future questions are borne out of these gender-based findings.   
 
Second, it appears as if bi-partisanship equates with more comprehensive legislation. There are 
usually dramatic partisan divides based on the fact that Democrats are more concerned with 
social welfare issues, and Republicans with crime and order. And importantly, these issue-
divides typically prevent bi-partisanship from taking place. Human trafficking, however, is a rare 
example where both parties have come together in support of a single cause. Since both parties 
want to see bills get passed, there has to be compromise and concessions; Democrats have to be 
willing to accept strict criminalization if they want victim assistance, and Republicans have to 
accept victim assistance if they desire criminalization. Taken as a whole, this bi-partisanship 
equates with more expansive anti-trafficking legislation.  
 
Third, this paper finds extremely significant support for the power of diffusion. As noted 
previously, the substantive implications of this are that states are learning from their neighbors, 
and late adopters are crafting more comprehensive legislation than earlier states. This finding 
presents an optimistic view for the future of human trafficking legislation. As states continue to 
expand their legislation, across state investment, civil penalties, and criminalization, there will be 
an increased probability that other states will follow suite. Whether resulting from ‘peer-
pressure,’ learning, or most probably both, the findings of this paper predict that we are likely to 
see a ripple effect of legislative comprehensiveness. 
 
Future Direction  
Although this paper presents a concrete picture of the determinants of comprehensive human 
trafficking legislation, there are a myriad of questions that still remain unanswered. We will 
conclude by presenting two future directions for this project. 
 First, we are interested in the implications of human trafficking being framed as a ‘woman’s 
issue’. As noted earlier, there appear to be distinct differences between the policy priorities of 
male and female legislators, with females more likely to introduce “women’s issue” bills. On the 
surface, this link between descriptive representation and substantive representation is a positive 
thing; the more women that are elected to public office, the more legislation relevant to, and 
beneficial for, women will be passed. However, this assumed relationship between an increase in 
female legislators and an increase in substantive policy outputs for women may be detrimental in 
the long-term. Most importantly, we argue that labeling issues as ‘women’s issues’ exonerates 
male legislators and male publics from taking responsibility on these issues. In other words, the 
term “women’s issues,” becomes synonymous with “not men’s issues”, thus deeming men 
irrelevant in the equation.  
 
That being said, men are not irrelevant in many issues that have been branded as “women’s 
issues.” As this paper made clear, female legislators are more interested in, and involved with, 
human trafficking legislation; there is a significant relationship between the proportion of female 
legislators and the comprehensiveness of human trafficking legislation. However, how has 
human trafficking become a ‘woman’s issue’ bill, and what are the implications of framing it in 
such a manner? Although women are most often seen as the victims of trafficking, and men the 
perpetrators, the story is just not that simple. First, there are a significant amount of boys who 
fall victim to trafficking. In fact, the policy entrepreneur in Texas initially became interested in 
the issue of trafficking after being told the story of a young male victim. And although this type 
of trafficking is quite common, male legislators were shocked when she recounted the story of 
this young man. Second, although the underlying power dynamics need to be explored in greater 
detail, some reports have indicated that the majority of traffickers are women (United Nations 
2009). Thus, the overall gender dynamics of the trafficking issue are much more fluid than is 
usually assumed. Why then has this issue fallen into the domain of female legislators, and more 
importantly, what are the consequences of this categorization? 
  
The second area that we will explore is the effectiveness of human trafficking legislation. Not 
only will we attempt to determine whether this type of legislation has a discernable effect on 
human trafficking within the states, but also we will take up the question of whether the 
legislation is meant to be effective in the first place. Specifically, we will ask whether legislators 
propose human trafficking bills because they seek substantive changes, or whether they propose 
such bills as a symbolic act meant to appease their constituents and/or interest groups. Although 
we would like to assume that all legislation is meant to have a tangible impact, it may be the case 
that these bills are introduced solely to make a statement.  In order to address this issue, we 
combine qualitative and quantitative data. Specifically, we will use 1) interview transcripts, 2) a 
survey sent out to every legislative sponsor, and 3) data on local- and state-level arrests and 
convictions for human trafficking.  
 
Table 1: State Investment 
 
 Model 1 
Victim 
Assistance 
Model 2 
Task Forces 
Model 3 
Training 
 
Model 4 
Reports 
 
Model 5 
State 
Investment 
Dummy 
Percent Democrats in the Senate  -3.79 
(2.78) 
-4.14 
(2.53) 
-5.68 
(3.96) 
 
-5.70*** 
(2.26) 
-2.61 
(1.99) 
Percent Democrats in the House 
  
3.87 
(2.93) 
5.89** 
(2.87) 
8.54** 
(4.32) 
 
6.14*** 
(2.48) 
2.39 
(2.10) 
Percent Females in the Senate -5.51 
(3.78) 
5.31** 
(2.81) 
-9.14* 
(5.14) 
 
7.60*** 
(2.64) 
5.47** 
(2.36) 
Percent Females in the House 
 
11.99** 
(4.87) 
18.38*** 
(4.75) 
28.10*** 
(8.24) 
 
11.56*** 
(3.79) 
11.63*** 
(3.32) 
Surplus 
 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
Illegal Population 
 
-34.26 
(34.12) 
5.89 
(29.30) 
-153.69*** 
(58.30) 
 
-19.34 
(23.83) 
-26.26 
(20.06) 
Violent Crime 
 
-75.81 
(167.61) 
-949.62*** 
(253.09) 
-161.94 
(221.77) 
 
 -560.68*** 
(172.57) 
-426.03*** 
(134.20) 
Population 8.33e 
(7.03e) 
5.50e 
(5.26e) 
2.74e** 
(1.14e) 
 
1.32 
(5.17) 
1.00e** 
(134.20) 
 Neighboring States 
 
4.14*** 
(.83) 
1.96*** 
(.67) 
5.47*** 
(1.39) 
 
2.15*** 
(.60) 
2.93*** 
(.56) 
Professionalized Legislature 
 
-.52 
(.36) 
-.52* 
(.32) 
.15 
(.47) 
 
-.26 
(.28) 
-.27 
(.24) 
Constant =4.43* 
(2.36) 
-5.32*** 
(2.08) 
-12.44*** 
(3.89) 
 
-4.69*** 
(1.82) 
-4.39*** 
(1.57) 
      
Log Likelihood -64.19 -72.24 -38.04 -88.90 -109.43 
N 276 276 276 276 276 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state-year.   
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Civil Penalties  
 
 Model 1 
Restitution 
Model 2 
Asset 
Forfeiture 
Model 3 
Civil Action 
 
Model 4 
Affirmative 
Defense 
 
Model 5 
Civil Penalties 
Dummy 
Percent Democrats in the Senate  -2.85 
(2.28) 
-8.39** 
(4.11) 
 
-1.64 
(3.07) 
-5.84 
(4.83) 
-5.37*** 
(2.07) 
Percent Democrats in the House 
  
-.19 
(2.32) 
13.42*** 
(4.62) 
 
4.41 
(3.54) 
5.06 
(4.26) 
3.53* 
(2.15) 
Percent Females in the Senate 8.20*** 
(3.22) 
2.71 
(6.39) 
 
6.10 
(4.23) 
-24.28** 
(8.42) 
2.27 
(2.73) 
Percent Females in the House 
 
-7.27* 
(4.15) 
-14.89** 
(7.40) 
 
.62 
(5.51) 
15.45* 
(8.43) 
.05 
(3.4) 
Surplus 
 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
Illegal Population 
 
46.87** 
(23.27) 
147.12*** 
(48.40) 
 
12.22 
(32.53) 
51.74 
(68.13) 
40.78** 
(21.36) 
Violent Crime 
 
-165.98 
(149.22) 
-774.58** 
(385.77) 
 
-274.35 
(217.96) 
-69.80 
(319.65) 
-146.06 
(133.99) 
Population -5.25e 
(4.92e) 
-3.76 
(1.66)** 
 
1.02e 
(7.16e) 
-9.94e 
(1.21e) 
=3.14e 
(4.75e) 
 Neighboring States 
 
3.04*** 
(.61) 
2.26** 
(1.09) 
 
4.01*** 
(1.07) 
4.62*** 
(1.59) 
3.59*** 
(.59) 
Professionalized Legislature 
 
-.66** 
(.30) 
-2.10*** 
(.78) 
 
-.04 
(.42) 
-1.20* 
(.68) 
-.70*** 
(.28) 
Constant .25 
(1.84) 
4.08 
(3.69) 
 
-7.71*** 
(3.06) 
-1.37 
(4.64) 
-.51 
(1.68) 
      
Log Likelihood -84.40 -33.73 -48.60 -27.80 -99.95 
N 276 276 276 276 276 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state-year.   
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Criminalization and Comprehensiveness  
 
 Model 1 
Max. Sentence 
 Trafficking 
Minor 
Model 2 
Max. Sentence 
Trafficking 
Adult 
Model 3 
Criminalize 
Dummy 
 
Model 4 
Legislative 
Comprehensiveness 
 
Percent Democrats in the Senate  6.7 
(14.11) 
 
-2.74 
(10.64) 
-3.67** 
(1.92) 
-2.05** 
(.93) 
Percent Democrats in the House 
  
-10.45 
(14.19) 
-2.70 
(10.71) 
 
2.69 
(1.97) 
1.70** 
(.98) 
Percent Females in the Senate 9.01 
(19.05) 
8.22 
(14.34) 
 
5.36** 
(2.43) 
2.54*** 
(1.09) 
Percent Females in the House 
 
20.95 
(21.18) 
10.91 
(15.98) 
 
3.75 
(2.96) 
3.60*** 
(1.42) 
Surplus 
 
-.00** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
.00 
(.00) 
0.00 
(.00) 
Illegal Population 
 
-11.49 
(143.85) 
2.63 
(108.55) 
 
-.14 
(18.59) 
-3.66 
(8.70) 
Violent Crime 
 
1561.29* 
(833.44) 
453.62 
(628.96) 
 
128.50 
(109.90) 
-60.25  
(54.10) 
Population 6.89e* 
(3.86e) 
1.95e 
(2.91e) 
 
7.51e  
(4.74e) 
4.59e** 
(2.15e) 
 Neighboring States 
 
19.96*** 
(3.99) 
12.64*** 
(3.01) 
 
4.37*** 
(.54) 
2.27*** 
(.24) 
Professionalized Legislature 
 
3.05* 
(1.84) 
.97 
(1.39) 
 
-.09 
(.24) 
-.14 
(.11) 
Constant -22.44** 
(11.05) 
-6.38 
(8.34) 
 
-4.53*** 
(1.49) 
 
     
Log Likelihood   -119.16  
Cutpoint1    1.88* 
(.71) 
Cutpoint2    2.52* 
(.71) 
Cutpoint3    3.15* 
(.71) 
N 207 207 276 276 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state-year.   
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < .10 
Table 4:  State Investment Summary 
 
State Year Victim 
Assistance 
Task Force Training Reports Total 
Alaska 2006 No No No No 0 
Arizona 2005 No No No No 0 
Arkansas 2005 No No No No 0 
California 2005 Yes (2006) Yes No No 2 
Colorado 2005 No Yes No Yes 2 
Connecticut 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 
Delaware 2007 No No No Yes 1 
Florida 2007 Yes No No No 1 
Georgia 2007 No No No No 0 
Hawaii 2007 Yes Yes No Yes 3 
Idaho 2005 No Yes No Yes 2 
Illinois 2005 No No No No 0 
Indiana 2006 Yes No Yes Yes 3 
Iowa 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 
Kansas 2005 No No No No 0 
Kentucky 2007 No No No No 0 
Louisiana 2005 No No No No 0 
Maine 2006 No Yes No Yes 2 
Maryland 2007 No No No No 0 
Michigan 2006 No No No No 0 
Minnesota 2005 No Yes No Yes 2 
Mississippi 2006 No No No No 0 
Missouri 2004 Yes No No No 1 
Montana 2007 No No No No 0 
Nebraska 2006 No No No Yes 1 
Nevada 2007 No No No No 0 
New Hampshire 2007 No Yes No Yes 2 
New Jersey 2005 Yes No No No 1 
New Mexico 2008 Yes Yes No Yes 3 
New York 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 
North Carolina 2007 Yes No Yes No 2 
Oklahoma 2008 Yes No No No 1 
Oregon 2007 No No No No 0 
Pennsylvania 2006 No No No No 0 
Rhode Island 2007 No No No No 0 
South Carolina 2006 No No No No 0 
Tennessee 2007 No No No No 0 
Texas 2007 No No No Yes 1 
Utah 2008 No No No No 0 
Virginia 2007 No Yes No Yes 2 
Washington 2003 No Yes No Yes 2 
Wisconsin 2008 Yes No No No 1 
Table 5:  Civil Penalty Summary 
   
State Year Restitution Asset 
Forfeiture 
Civil Action Affirmative 
Defense 
Total 
Alaska 2006 No No No No 0 
Arizona 2005 Yes No No No 1 
Arkansas 2005 No No No No 0 
California 2005 Yes No Yes No 2 
Colorado 2006 No No No No 0 
Connecticut 2006 No No Yes No 1 
Delaware 2007 Yes No No No 1 
Florida 2004 No No Yes No 1 
Georgia 2007 No No No No 0 
Hawaii 2007 No No No No 0 
Idaho 2006 Yes No No No 1 
Illinois 2005 Yes Yes No No 2 
Indiana 2006 Yes No No No 1 
Iowa 2006 No No No Yes 1 
Kansas 2005 No No No No 0 
Kentucky 2007 No No Yes No 1 
Louisiana 2005 No No No No 0 
Maine 2008 Yes Yes Yes No 3 
Maryland 2007 No No No No 0 
Michigan 2006 No No No No 0 
Minnesota 2005 No No No No 0 
Mississippi 2006 No No No No 0 
Missouri 2004 Yes No No No 1 
Montana 2007 No No No No 0 
Nebraska 2006 No No No No 0 
Nevada 2007 No Yes Yes No 2 
New Hampshire 2007 No No No No 0 
New Jersey 2005 Yes Yes No No 2 
New Mexico 2008 Yes No No Yes 2 
New York 2007 No No No Yes 1 
North Carolina 2007 No No No No 0 
Oklahoma 2008 Yes No Yes Yes 3 
Oregon 2007 Yes No Yes No 2 
Pennsylvania 2006 Yes Yes No No 2 
Rhode Island 2007 Yes Yes No No 2 
South Carolina 2006 No No No No 0 
Tennessee 2007 Yes No No No 1 
Texas 2003 No No No No 0 
Utah 2008 No No No No 0 
Virginia 2007 No No No No 0 
Washington 2003 No No No No 0 
Wisconsin 2008 Yes No Yes Yes 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6:  Criminalization Summary 
 
State Year Minimum 
Sex 
Maximum 
Sex 
Minimum 
Labor 
Maximum 
Labor 
Increased 
for Minor 
Alaska 2006 1 20 1 20 No 
Arizona 2005      
Arkansas 2005 5 20 5 20 No 
California 2005 3 8 3 8 Yes 
Colorado 2005 4 24 4 24 No (Less) 
Connecticut 2007 1 20 1 20 No 
Delaware 2007 1 100 1 25 Yes (Sex) 
Florida 2007 0 30 0 30 Yes 
Georgia 2007 1 20 1 20 Yes 
Hawaii 2007 0 0 0 0 -- 
Idaho 2005 0 25 0 25 No 
Illinois 2005 1 30 1 30 Yes 
Indiana 2006 2 30 2 10 Yes 
Iowa 2006 0 25 0 25 Yes 
Kansas 2005 9 23 9 23 Yes 
Kentucky 2007 1 20 1 20 Yes 
Louisiana 2005 0 25 0 25 Yes 
Maine 2006 0 0 0 0 -- 
Maryland 2007 0 25 0 25 Yes 
Michigan 2006      
Minnesota 2005 0 20 0 15 Yes (Sex) 
Mississippi 2006 0 30 0 20 Yes (Sex) 
Missouri 2004 0 30 0 15 Yes (Sex) 
Montana 2007 0 100 0 100 No 
Nebraska 2006 0 50 0 50 Yes 
Nevada 2007 0 20 0 10 No 
New Hampshire 2007 0 0 0 0 -- 
New Jersey 2005 0 20 0 20 No 
New Mexico 2008 2 100 2 100 Yes 
New York 2007 15 100 0 7 No 
North Carolina 2007      
Oklahoma 2008 5 100 5 100 Yes 
Oregon 2007 0 10 0 10 No 
Pennsylvania 2007 0 20 0 20 No 
Rhode Island 2006 0 40 0 40 Yes 
South Carolina 2006 0 15 0 15 No 
Tennessee 2007 3 30 3 30 No 
Texas 2007 2 99 2 99 Yes 
Utah 2008 1 100 1 100 No 
Virginia 2007 0 0 0 0 -- 
Washington 2003 1 14 1 14 No 
Wisconsin 2008 1 40 1 25 Yes (Sex) 
 
Table 7:  Overall Score for Human Trafficking Legislative Comprehensiveness 
 
State Civil Penalty Score State Investment 
Score 
Criminalization Total Score 
Connecticut 1 4 1 6 
Iowa 1 4 1 6 
New Mexico 2 3 1 6 
New York 1 4 1 6 
New York 1 4 1 6 
California 2 2 1 5 
Indiana 1 3 1 5 
Maine 3 2 0 5 
Oklahoma 3 1 1 5 
Wisconsin 3 1 1 5 
Idaho 1 2 1 4 
New Jersey 2 1 1 4 
Colorado 0 2 1 3 
Delaware 1 1 1 3 
Florida 1 1 1 3 
Hawaii 0 3 0 3 
Illinois 2 0 1 3 
Minnesota 0 2 1 3 
Missouri 1 1 1 3 
Nevada 2 0 1 3 
North Carolina 0 2 1 3 
Oregon 2 0 1 3 
Pennsylvania 2 0 1 3 
Rhode Island 2 0 1 3 
Washington 0 2 1 3 
Arizona 1 0 1 2 
Kentucky 1 0 1 2 
Nebraska 0 1 1 2 
New Hampshire 0 2 0 2 
Tennessee 1 0 1 2 
Texas 0 1 1 2 
Virginia 0 2 0 2 
Alaska 0 0 1 1 
Arkansas 0 0 1 1 
Georgia 0 0 1 1 
Kansas 0 0 1 1 
Louisiana 0 0 1 1 
Maryland 0 0 1 1 
Michigan 0 0 1 1 
Mississippi 0 0 1 1 
Montana 0 0 1 1 
South Carolina 0 0 1 1 
Utah 0 0 1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
States with no law by 2008: 
Alabama 
Massachussetts 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
South Dakota 
Vermont 
Wyoming 
West Virginia 
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